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NOTES
Constitutional Law-Defamation-Misstatements of Fact about Pub-
lic Figure Privileged
Defendant corporations published news items received from na-
tional wire services reporting involvement of the plantiff, former
Major General Edwin A. Walker, in riots at the University of
Mississippi. The stories stated that the plaintiff had led a charge
of rioters against United States marshals who were present to en-
force court orders requiring integration of the university. In Walker
v. Courier Journal' the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Kentucky dismissed the complaint with prejudice,
holding that it could not be sustained constitutionally under the
ruling of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'
The Sullivan case held that the first amendment guarantee of
free speech prohibits a public official from recovering damages for de-
famatory misstatements of fact relating to his official conduct unless
he can prove the statements were made with actual malice.3 The
Walker court found that the Supreme Court did not intend that the
rule be limited to public officials, but must be extended to "public
men" as well. The court held that by injecting himself into an
issue of national concern the plaintiff had brought himself into the
category to which the rule should apply. Concluding that the defen-
dants had a right to rely on the news-gathering agencies and were
not obligated to check the facts contained in the reports, the court
ruled that there could be no basis for a finding of actual malice in
republishing the reports. 4
The Walker court found justification for the extension in what
it found to be the import of the Sullivan decision. Two passages
from Sullivan were especially relied upon. The court pointed to a
footnote to the holding in which the Supreme Court suggested that
'246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
2376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'Ibid. In order to show actual malice the plaintiff must prove a knowing
falsehood or the reckless disregard of whether the statement was true or
false. Id. at 279-80.
'The widespread publication of the same statements in other newspapers
as shown by the suits Walker had pending in other jurisdictions was also
treated by the court as evidence of the lack of malice. See New Orleans
Times-Picayune, Oct. 30, 1965, § 1. p. 3, col. 1.
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it would leave to later decisions the question of how far the rule
would be extended,' implying to the Walker court that it would be
stretched beyond public officials. The court also relied on a quota-
tion in Sullivan of dictum from Coleman v. MacLennan," a declara-
tion that the "privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and
includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for
office."'7 Coleman, which was quoted extensively in Sullivan, is the
leading case for the rule of a minority of American jurisdictions
that before Sullivan had adopted a qualified privilege protecting
misstatements of fact about public officials8 and candidates for
office.' This rule had not received wide acceptance before being
approved by Sullivan, and only in scattered and seemingly unrelated
decisions within the minority had it been extended beyond public
officials and candidates."° Like Sullivan, the Coleman rule repre-
"We have no occasion here'to determine how far down into the lower
ranks of governmental employees the 'public official' designation would ex-
tend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons
who would or would not be included." 376 U.S. at 283 n.23. (Emphasis
added.) It could be argued that rather than implying that the rule is to be
extended beyond public officials, the Court is simply saying it did not need
to determine at that time who would or would not be included in the category
of public official.
'78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
Id. at 723, 98 Pac. at 285.
'E.g., Snively v. Record Pub. Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921);
Salinger v. Cowles, 195 Iowa 873, 191 N.W. 167 (1922); Ponder v. Cobb,
257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962). See Annot., 110 A.L.R. 412 (1937);
Annot., 150 A.L.R. 358 (1944); Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and
Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 875, 896-97 (1949).
'Eg., Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N.W. 974
(1925) ; But see Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d
837 (1943). There the court limited the rule to criticism of the official acts
of public officials.
" These cases are of little help as background for a "public man" rule
because they are usually based not on any policy considerations but on a
misreading of prior cases or a confusion of privileges. In Crane v. Waters,
10 Fed. 619 (D. Mass. 1882), the court granted the privilege to statements
made about the plaintiff's attempted takeover of a railroad, but it supported
its holding by citing cases involving completely distinct privileges of fair
comment and the right to make an accurate report of legislative proceedings.
In Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 Atl. 411 (1896), where the criticism
was made of the plaintiff's construction of a public building, the court
granted the privilege as one falling into the category of the right to com-
municate information to one who has an interest in the subject matter,
but it was limited by Pattangall v. Mooers, 113 Me. 412, 94 At1. 561 (1915).
Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d
440 (1955), cited Crane v. Waters, supra, Bearce v. Bass, supra, and cases
dealing with other privileges in denying recovery to a corporation president.
If there is a leading case for this minority within the minority, it is
probably McLean v. Merriman, 42 S.D. 394, 175 N.W. 878 (1920), in
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sented a determination by the courts that the right of the official or
the candidate to a truthful report of his activities is outweighed by
the right of the public to free discussion of those who govern or
wish to govern it." By extending the rule, the Walker court has
declared that this right to free discussion applies also to men who
are attempting to influence the opinion of the public about a subject
in which it has an interest.
An extension of the rule beyond Sullivan to the Walker situa-
tion must be justified by the first amendment. Ideally, the task that
would befall the courts would be to formulate a definition of "public
man" that would insure a maximum freedom of speech not only
for the critic but for the public man himself. The courts must
formulate standards by which it will be possible to ascertain when
a plaintiff has brought himself into the class of public men." Two
criteria were adopted in Walker. The court first found that the
subject matter of the news reports was of "grave national concern"
and therefore a legitimate issue for widespread public discussion.
It then found that the plaintiff had injected himself into this issue
and had "interwoven his personal status into that of a public one
whereby he . . . [became] the subject of substantial press, radio
and television news comment; thus magnifying the chance that his
activities would be 'erroneously' reported.' 3 In balancing private
interests in reputation against first amendment guarantees, a court
applying a "public man" rule may be faced with two determinations
not present in Sullivan: the value of free public discussion of the
particular issue, and the extent to which the plaintiff will be deemed
which the statements charged that the leader of a campaign against a woman-
suffrage amendment was allied with the liquor interests. The court held
that the plaintiff stood much in the position of a candidate for public
office and that any information about the forces back of the campaign was a
matter of public interest and concern and therefore was privileged.
" Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
" The status of "public man" should have no relation to the extent to
which the defamation itself has created controversy or placed the plaintiff's
name before the public. But see Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal
Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955). There, plaintiff was a corpora-
tion president, and in connection with a municipal election campaign defen-
dant stated falsely that plaintiff's business was closing and 1000 jobs were
to be lost. The court found that plaintiff as a corporation president was a
public man and that a loss of jobs was an issue of public interest. Quaere:
Should the defamation be privileged if the threatened loss of jobs was an
issue of the defendant's own invention?
" 246 F. Supp. at 234.
[Vol. 44
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to have waived protection against damaging misstatements by pro-
jecting himself into the issue.
A rule which requires the courts to determine the interest the
public has in the discussion of the issue may be as difficult to
standardize into a working definition as the concept of obscenity has
been for the Supreme Court.14 As long as the first amendment is
not deemed to preempt the law of libel completely,15 however, some
such limitation will have to evolve.
An inseparable part of this requirement of a "public issue" is
a determination that the individual criticized has participated in the
issue. The courts may be aided by the pre-Sullivan cases applying
privileges to criticism of persons in the public eye. The qualified
privilege protecting misstatement of fact about officials and candi-
dates has often been confused with the fair comment privilege 0 by
the courts." The fair comment privilege arose originally as an
immunity for criticism of literary works.' 8 Later, 9 when the value
of free discussion of the government was accepted, it was extended
by analogy to criticism of government officials.2" As such, it has
protected comment and opinion only, not misstatement of fact,
21
and the jury has had the burden of distinguishing fact from opin-
ion.22 The misstatement-of-fact privilege has antecedents different
from those of fair comment; its principle justification is by exten-
sion from the privilege allowing falsehoods when the person to
" See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
" It is unclear whether even Mr. Justice Black, applying his theory that
the first amendment is an "absolute," would conclude that no defamation is
ever actionable. See Leflar, The Free-ness of Free Speech, 15 VAND. L.
REv. 1073, 1079-80 (1962). For an "absolutist" approach that would exclude
private libels see Meiklejohn, The First Amendnent Is an Absolute, 1961
Sup. CT. REv. 245, 259.
"' Whether fair comment is a privilege or whether statements subject to
the fair comment rule are not defamatory at all is a question that is still
debated. See 41 N.C.L. Rv. 153, 154-55 (1962).
"1 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 449 (1956). See, e.g., Crane v. Waters,
10 Fed. 619 (D. Mass. 1882); Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co.,
142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955).
" Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEXAS L. REv. 41, 53 (1929); Veeder,
Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARv. L. REv. 413-14 (1910).
" In the early nineteenth century criticism of government officials was
still severely inhibited by libel laws while criticism of literary works was
privileged. See HOLT, LIBEL 96, 213 (Am. ed. 1818).
20 Hallen, supra note 18, at 53; Veeder, supra note 18, at 414.
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 606(1), comment b (1938).
"Id. § 618.
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whom the publication is made has a protectible interest in the facts
communicated.23
Fair comment, like the misstatement-of-fact privilege, is to a
great extent a recognition of the public interest in free discussion,2 4
but in many cases there are other weighty considerations that move
the courts to invoke fair comment. The court may conclude in a
particular case that one who submits himself to public scrutiny for
profit or for personal gratification should not complain when the
reaction is not to his liking since he is in effect asking to be judged.25
Further, the court naturally hesitates to enter the field of literary,
artistic, or political criticism by attempting to set up standards by
which to determine the justification of damaging opinion.2" Neither
of these arguments has much force in the typical case of misstate-
ment of fact concerning a public official or candidate for office. The
public official or candidate is asking to be judged in an even more
literal sense than the artist, and the right to fair comment applies
to his critics with equal or greater force. By inviting opinion he is
risking his reputation, but it does not follow that he is courting
misstatements of fact simply by taking a public stand. Misstate-
ments may be more likely to occur, but this is because of the public
interest in reporting his activities. In that sense, the simple fact
that he has submitted himself to public scrutiny bears no logical
relation to the misstatement privilege. Indeed, the facts of his public
activities are more easily accessible because they are public.
The second argument buttressing the right to fair comment, that
the court's opinion is no more correct than the critic's, is also largely
inapplicable to the misstatement privilege. Granting the practical
and theoretical difficulties of distinguishing fact from opinion, 7 the
court still is more justified in allowing the jury to determine that
a fact is true or false than that an opinion is reasonable or un-
reasonable.
The public figure concept that gives rise to a privilege in the
23 See Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 AtI. 411 (1896); Burt v. Advertiser
Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 242-43, 28 N.E. 1, 4 (1891) (recognizing
the analogy but denying its application).
" See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 110 (3rd ed. 1964); 1 HARPER &
JAMEs, TORTS § 5.28 (1956); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 606-07 (1938).
" Carr v. Hood, 1 Camp. 355, 358, 170 Eng. Rep. 983, 985 (K.B. 1808).
"' See, e.g., Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St.
118, 137, 95 N.E. 735, 740 (1911).
" See Noel, supra note 8, at 878-80.
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right-to-privacy cases is similar to fair comment in that it includes
not only those who abhor publicity but must suffer it because of
the public interest involved (i.e., the criminal), but also those who
have sought publicity and for whom a claim to a right of privacy
would be therefore contradictory. 28
The definition of "public man" for the purpose of extending
the Sullivan rule presumably would be narrower than that applied
to fair comment and the right to privacy. It would be based on
public interest and only insofar as that interest is protected by the
first amendment. The extent to which a plaintiff is known should
be weighed only in determining the public interest in discussing his
activities. The criticism engendered by his public stand must fall
within the purview of the first amendment's assurance of the "un-
fettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people."'29  In a new York case,
Dempsey v. Time Inc.,30 the court refused to extend the Sullivan
privilege to a magazine article containing defamatory material about
one of the famous prizefighter's bouts. The court was of the opinion
that public interest in discussing a sports event of forty years ago
was not sufficient to be protected by a first amendment privilege."
Another consideration that must be weighed in a judicial formu-
lation of a "public man" rule is the possibility that a broad privilege
will inhibit public discussion rather than encourage it. The classic
objection to the Sullivan privilege as it existed at the common law
was that such a rule would tend to discourage qualified people from
2" See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. Rav. 383, 410-15 (1960).
2 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
"043 Misc. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
" Cf. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529
(Sup. Ct. 1964). There a famous baseball pitcher was granted an injunc-
tion against publication of a fictionalized biography on the grounds that it
invaded his right of privacy. The court rejected any application of the
Sullivan rule. But cf. Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d
Cir. 1964) (dictum). There, the statements were made about the pacifist
beliefs of a renowned scientist. The court suggested that had it not held
for the defendant on other grounds it would have done so by application of
Sullivan. Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup.
Ct. 1964). In this case the defendant suggested that the mayor permitted
a conflict of interest in allowing members of his law firm to practice before
the city court. Plaintiff, a member of the firm, was denied recovery on the
alternate grounds that he was not sufficiently identified as one to whom the
damaging statements referred and that his position was so closely related
to that of the mayor as to make him a "public official" within the meaning
of the rule in Sullivan.
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seeking office.32 If this argument seems to underestimate the mettle
of American politicians, 3 it becomes more relevant when applied to
the public man or the potential public man. If the rule is limited
to include only those who wield great power and influence, there
would seem to be no danger, but if every writer of letters to the
editor or soapbox speaker becomes subject to massive and permis-
sively irresponsible criticism by the press for which he has no legal
redress, there may be fewer such people. The first amendment may
cut two ways; it should not be interpreted so as to inhibit the public
man any more than his critics. In Barr v. Matteo34 the Supreme
Court held that the head of a federal executive department had an
absolute privilege against a libel action for a publication within his
official discretion. Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissent3 5 pointed out
that this holding created an imbalance likely to limit public discus-
sion, since there was no generally corresponding privilege accorded
to critics of executive officers. In a sense the Sullivan case restored
the balance and even extended it, since criticism of all public officials
is privileged. The question arises whether a privilege protecting
misstatements about public men requires some sort of re-balancing
of rights that will protect the interests and free speech rights of
one who may be a public man. If the rule is extended, will it provide
the balance within itself, so that whoever criticizes the public man
will automatically become a public man himself and subject to the
rule? Granted that it will, the right to counterattack hardly seems
a realistic remedy to some classes of persons who could conceivably
be deemed public men. 6
JOHN L. W. GARROU
" See Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, 541 (6th Cir. 1893).
" See Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 733-34, 98 Pac. 281, 289
(1908) ; Noel, supra note 8, at 895.
'360 U.S. 564 (1959).
Id. at 578.
"See Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel, 49 CORMELL
L.Q. 581, 602-03 (1964). Two recent cases have declined to follow the
holding of the principal case primarily because each court felt that to do
so would destroy the balance created by Barr v. Matteo and the Sullivan
case. Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2297 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 23, 1965); Clark v. Pearson, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2338 (D.D.C. Dec. 20,
1965).
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